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Abstract 
In 2008, Sweden introduced a cash-for-care benefit consisting of a flat-rate sum paid by 
municipalities to parents of children between the ages of one and three who did not use 
publicly subsidized childcare. The main object of the reform was to increase parents’ 
‘freedom to choose’, but the policy was criticized because of its potentially negative effects 
on gender equality and mothers’ employment. This study focuses on the effects of cash-for-
care on female employment in Sweden. The study shows that the adoption of this policy had 
negative effects on female employment rates and female employment growth rates in non-
urban areas.  
Cash-for-care was abolished in Sweden in 2016, but similar policies are still in place in other 
Scandinavian countries. This research contributes to the debate on family policy and its 
developments, in particular in Scandinavian countries. 
 
Introduction 
Sweden has a long and strong tradition of policies promoting gender equality in both the 
private and public spheres. Extended and affordable public childcare services, the possibility 
of sharing parental leave equally between parents, and individual taxation are some of the 
pillars supporting the earner-carer family model prevalent in the country (© European Union, 
2015; Ferrarini & Duvander, 2010; Korpi, 2000). The model has been designed to support 
mothers’ participation in the labour market while keeping fertility levels relatively high 
(McDonald, 2000; Oláh & Bernhardt, 2008): in 2012, the employment rate for mothers of 
children under six was 76.8%, the third highest in the European Union (© European Union, 
2014) and the Swedish total fertility rate was 1.91, the sixth highest rate in the same group of 
countries (Eurostat data).  
3 
 
In this context, the cash-for-care policy (in Swedish: vårdnadsbidrag), that is a 
subsidy for the parents of children between age one and three not using publicly subsidised 
childcare, was introduced in Sweden in 2008. Cash-for-care could be used by parents who had 
used at least 250 days of their parental leave benefit and eligibility for the subsidy was not 
conditional on parents’ employment. It could thus be used as an allowance or income 
compensation for the parents who stayed home with the child, but also for private childcare. 
The main aim for this study is to understand whether cash-for-care influenced mothers’ 
employment in Sweden. 
 Cash-for-care schemes are commonly classified as male breadwinner family policies 
(Duvander & Ellingsater, 2016; Ellingsaeter, 2012, 2016), because they imply a division of 
labour in the couple between one ‘earner’ and one ‘carer’: such schemes are viewed as 
contrasting with the prevalent Nordic model of ‘dual earner‒carers’ and the objectives of 
gender equality. The main purpose of this specific policy was to increase parents’ freedom of 
choice in terms of childcare options and parents’ possibility of staying at home with the child 
(Parliament’s proposition 2007/08:91). However, the policy was controversial and in the view 
of the opposition parties and many academics, the policy was feared to become a ‘trap for 
women’ (Hilamo & Kangas, 2009), especially for mothers with a high risk of unemployment. 
In fact, once it was introduced, the cash-for-care was mostly used by mothers (over 90% of 
users), and, in particular, by disproportionate shares of unemployed mothers with low levels 
of education, foreign-born and with more than two children (Statistics Sweden, 2011, 2012). 
With regard to employed parents, a recent study shows that the incomes of parents using cash-
for-care in 2012 was lower than the income of parents that did not use the policy, in both the 
year before (2011) and the year after (2013) the cash-for-care period (Statistics Sweden, 
2014a).  
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In this study our aim was to answer the research questions: Did the cash-for-care 
policy affect female employment in Sweden? Did it cause a reduction in female employment 
or female employment growth rates?  
 Several early studies have found a negative association between cash-for-care and 
mothers’ employment, particularly in Norway (Drange & Rege, 2013; Naz, 2004; Rønsen, 
2009; Schøne, 2004). However, there is a scarcity of studies on the subject in the Swedish 
context. In this study, the aggregated effects of the cash-for-care policy on female 
employment are analysed with particular reference to Sweden. In trying to understand the 
nexus between cash-for-care and female employment, we made use of the fact that some 
municipalities introduced the policy and some did not, to study variations between 
municipalities as a quasi-experiment, where some municipalities were ‘treated’ with the cash-
for-care (treated group of municipalities), and some others were not (‘control’ group of 
municipalities). First, we compared female employment trends in similar types of treated and 
control municipalities. Second, we ran linear regressions to estimate the effects of cash-for-
care on changes in female employment rates after the introduction of the policy, controlling 
for the characteristics of the municipalities (urban/rural areas, male employment growth rates 
and female unemployment rates) and characteristics of the local female population (shares of 
women with low and high education, shares of foreign-born women, and fertility levels). 
A further objective of this study is more policy-focused: since cash-for-care was 
abolished in Sweden on 1 January 2016, it is useful to evaluate any effects that the policy 
might have had on female employment when it was in place in order to be aware of what may 
happen if it is introduced again. Our main hypothesis in this study is that the cash-for-care 
policy in Sweden affected mothers’ participation on the labour market in two ways: as an 
incentive to withdraw from the labour market for employed mothers and as a disincentive to 
enter the labour market for unemployed mothers. 
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We first describe the specifications of the cash-for-care policy in order to clarify the 
policy rationale and context. Following, we present the theoretical and empirical background 
of the study. In the data analysis section we present our data, research design and results, 
showing the trends of female employment rates and the estimated effects of cash-for-care on 
female employment growth rates. We end with the conclusions. 
  
The cash-for-care policy 
The cash-for-care policy was first introduced in Sweden in June 1994 by a Liberal-
Conservative government but was abolished soon after by the following government, led by 
the Social Democratic Party, in January 1995 (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2013a). The 
next time cash-for-care was introduced was in 2008 by a new Liberal-Conservative 
government, with the Christian Democrats as the strongest advocates. The main rationale 
underpinning the policy was the ‘freedom to choose’ framework. Thus, the declared objective 
of the reform was to increase the possibilities for parents to stay at home with their young 
children (Parliament’s proposition 2007/08:91).  
 The opposition parties (Social Democrats, Left Party and the Green Party) strongly 
opposed the policy, their main arguments focusing on the negative effects on gender equality 
and the superior pedagogical value attributed to professional childcare (Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency, 2013a). In the consultations about the law-proposal and in the general 
debate about the proposals, comments on the positive aspects of increased parent-child time 
and concerns with regard to gender equality, work supply, and the general principle of 
arbetslinjen (the priority of work over income-support for all individuals) were raised 
(Parliament’s proposition 2007/08:91).  
 With the introduction of cash-for-care in June 2008, Swedish municipalities were 
allowed to choose whether or not to offer the policy and about a third of them decided to do 
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so. The capital municipality of Stockholm, for example, offered the policy until 2015. The 
cash-for-care consisted of a tax-free, flat-rate sum (3000 SEK, around 325 EUR per month 
per child) which was paid by the municipality to the parents of children between one and 
three (13‒35 months old) who had used a minimum of 250 days of parental leave benefit and 
who did not use publicly subsidised childcare. Although there was no employment 
requirement to be eligible for the policy, cash-for-care could not be combined with other 
social transfers in the household (parental leave, unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, 
support for activities included in job-oriented programmes, pensions benefits, asylum-seekers’ 
support etc.). This meant that if a parent or a co-resident partner (either the other parent or a 
new partner) received social benefits, cash-for-care could not be claimed. For this reason, the 
use of cash-for-care was expected to be limited among non-working parents. The use of cash-
for-care was flexible as it could be taken full-time or part-time, although only a parent who 
lived with the child was allowed to benefit from full-time cash-for-care. It was also possible 
to share the benefit between parents as well as to combine part-time cash-for-care with part-
time publicly subsidised child-care. Similar to parental leave, cash-for-care included a job-
guarantee for employed parents, i.e., the right to return to the same workplace with the same 
(or an equivalent) job after the cash-for-care period ended. 
As the main rationale of the policy was to allow parents the ‘freedom to choose’, we 
will now clarify the context in which the policy was developed and briefly introduce the main 
childcare options existing in Sweden: parental leave, private care and publicly subsidised 
childcare. Concerning the first option, that of parental leave, all parents in Sweden were 
entitled to 390 days of parental leave (of which 60 days were reserved to each parents) if they 
stayed at home with the child and therefore could not work, study or seek employment 
(Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2015). In order to be eligible for cash-for-care, they had to 
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have used at least 250 days of parental leave and therefore the cash-for-care was intended to 
prolong the parental leave period. 
The second option, that of private childcare, is extremely unusual in Sweden and a 
recent study by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency indicates that about 97% of children go 
straight from parental care in the home to publicly subsidised childcare (Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency, 2013b). This means that the most common alternative to cash-for-care 
when children are between 13 and 35 months old was thus publicly subsidised childcare, the 
third option listed above. Since the beginning of the 2000s, guaranteed places have been made 
available in such care for all children from the age of one, and the cost of these places is 
heavily subsidised. A point in their favour is that this childcare is considered high quality, 
with the majority of the personnel being professionally trained, often at tertiary level (Korpi 
2007).  
Together with the availability of childcare facilities, the combination of work and 
family is also aided by flexibility on the labour market. In 2013, around 45% of employed 
mothers whose youngest child was 1‒2 years old worked part time (Statistics Sweden, 2014b, 
p.58). This is possible as Swedish parents have the right to decrease their working time by up 
to 25% until the child is eight years old (© European Union, 2015).  
Between 4 and 5% of the parents of eligible children used cash-for-care between 2009 
and 2013 (Statistics Sweden, 2011, 2012, 2014a). This is a very low percentage compared 
with the other Nordic countries and to the share of children in the same age enrolled in public 
childcare. The Swedish low use of cash-for-care can be compared with a higher use in 
Norway and Finland. In the former country about a fourth of parents use the benefit. The 
Norwegian cash-for-care, introduced in 1998, is a national benefit and covers parents to 
children between age one and two. Although the amount paid for cash-for-care was initially 
similar to that paid in Sweden, since August 2014 cash-for-care has been raised to 6,000 NOK 
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per month in Norway (i.e., around 690 EUR, Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration, 
2014). Importantly, in Norway, cash-for-care can be combined with other social benefits in 
the household, meaning that it is claimed in many households where it would not have been 
possible for households in Sweden to do so. In addition, the length of parental leave differs in 
Norway and Sweden, affecting the scope and use of cash-for-care. The Norwegian paid 
parental leave lasts one year while Sweden offers a longer parental leave of 16 months, with 
very flexible rules of use, often resulting in a longer leave (Duvander & Viklund, 2014). A 
higher use of parental leave in Norway has also earlier been explained by the lack of public 
childcare alternatives (Ellingsaeter, 2012). Parallel with the expansion of public childcare, the 
use of cash-for-care in Norway decreased from 91%in 1998 (Bungum & Kvande, 2013) to 
27% in 2010 (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2013a). 
In Finland, the use of cash-for-care is still high, with the parents of about half of all the 
eligible children using the cash-for-care annually (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2013a). 
The benefit level differs between municipalities, something that also influences its level of 
use (Kosonen 2011). As in Norway, cash-for-care can be combined with social transfers, and 
a much less flexible parental leave system is in place, compared with Sweden. In addition, 
cash-for-care seems in Finland to be less politically contested and the norm for mothers to 
stay at home with their children for longer is stronger (Rantalaiho 2010). In 2014, quotas for 
cash-for-care were proposed, whereby the cash available for care would be split 50-50 among 
the parents (Eydal et al., 2014); this proposal was, however, withdrawn later (Austrian 
Institute for Family Studies, 2015). 
 
Why use cash-for-care and what does it lead to? 
According to new household economic theory (Becker, 1975; Mincer & Polachek, 1974), 
cash-for-care increases the relative price of public day care (the day-care fee) and decreases 
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the opportunity-cost of staying at home with the children with respect to going out to work. 
Of the two parents, the opportunity-cost of staying at home with the children is lower for the 
parent with the lower salary or the parent working fewer hours (the assumed hourly salary 
being the same between the two), i.e., more often than not, the mother. Like all neoclassic 
theories, this approach is criticised as the premises on which it is based are, first, that 
individuals make perfectly informed decisions (they have perfect knowledge of 
costs/opportunity, alternatives etc.) and, second, that their decisions are based on strictly 
economic evaluations. Moreover, the family is considered as a single unit of choice. In this 
perspective, divergences between the members of the family and external influences are not 
taken into account.  
In reality, it is more likely that individuals negotiate decisions with other members of 
their families and in combination with various degrees of restrictions and flexibility. The 
choice to use cash-for-care depends on wider societal contexts and on what alternatives are 
available (Morgan & Zippel, 2003).  
Cash for care aligns well with the current gender roles and expectations on mothers to 
take on most of the childcare of small children and to prioritise childcare over work. Even in a 
country like Sweden, with a strong family policy directed towards gender equality, gendered 
behaviour is prevalent. This is especially true for parents of small children, as the mother 
usually takes the lion’s share of the parental leave (Duvander & Johnsson, 2012). The 
gendered division of childcare has often been interpreted as parents being involved in 
constructing gender, or ‘doing gender’, as the result of the choices they make relating to their 
division of childcare and household tasks (Evertsson, 2013). That is to say, both women and 
men are involved in creating gender. Using cash-for-care is one way of manifesting the 
female role as mainly responsible for childcare. Cash for care may therefore reinforce 
traditional gender roles by recognising and institutionalising the role played by mothers in 
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childcare (Morgan & Zippel, 2003). Gendered childcare, in turn, may influence other areas of 
division of work. Previous research has shown that the decisions taken by parents on how to 
share the household work are often linked to mother’s working hours (Rønsen, 2001). 
Division of housework may also be affected by the local context, indicating variations also 
within a country (Lappegard, Kjeldstad, & Skardhamar, 2012). 
In a context in which previous family policy supported the dual-earner family model 
and gender equality by promoting parental leave and subsidised childcare (Eydal et al., 2015), 
the introduction of cash-for-care seems to go not just towards an adult worker model (Lewis, 
2001) but also in other, more complex directions. Cash-for-care may, for example, be seen as 
constituting a step towards ‘familialism’, or a contradictory part of the Swedish policy (Daly, 
2011). Sweden is often taken as an example of a country promoting gender equal policy that 
also recognises the importance of care (Daly, 2011; Lewis, 2001; Pfau-Effinger, 2006). The 
introduction of cash-for-care may thus be part of a potential new direction of policy where the 
choice between different types of combinations of work and childcare activities or different 
types of childcare becomes more central (Ferrarini & Duvander, 2010). A tendency towards a 
‘free choice’ model can also be seen to be emerging in other Scandinavian countries (Eydal et 
al., 2015). In the context of this study, however, it is important to understand the 
consequences that these choices will have: the cash-for-care policy, creating economic 
incentives for the mothers to stay at home, may, for instance, negatively affect the mothers’ 
social and human capital. Drange and Rege (2013) highlighted the loss of information and 
deterioration of contact-network in the labour market during the cash-for-care period, as well 
as the depreciation of general and firm-specific human capital such as job experience and 
skills accumulation. This is particularly important considering that the cash-for-care eligibility 
period follows parental leave, thus further prolonging the mother’s time on leave. 
Psychological and motivational factors may also affect the decision to return to work, as a 
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long time away from work has been found to affect attitudes towards work and work-
commitment (Evertsson, 2013). 
Turning our attention to empirical studies, research has widely shown negative effects 
of cash-for-care on mothers’ employment working hours and income in Norway (Drange & 
Rege, 2013; Naz, 2004; Rønsen, 2009; Schøne, 2004) but little is known about the effect of 
cash-for-care in Sweden. Using the Norwegian living standard surveys from 1998 and 1999, 
Naz (2004) found that the reform reduces women’s labour force participation in terms of 
working hours and increases specialisation in the couples, understood as difference between 
the fathers’ and the mothers’ working hours. Using register data, Schøne (2004) confirmed a 
reduction in eligible mothers’ employment and working hours in the short-term. Long-term 
effects seem even more substantial. Rønsen (2009) analysed results from three special surveys 
collected just before the cash-for-care reform in Norway as well as one year and four years 
after it. The most visible effect in the short term was the switch of mothers’ working time 
from full-time to part-time jobs. Working hours decreased in both the short and the long term, 
but the reduction was stronger in the long term. In the long term, that is, the probability that 
mothers would work declined, and employed mothers became more likely to be on leave, that 
is, taking any paid or unpaid leave available to them following childbirth.  
Using register data, Drange and Rege (2013) confirmed the negative effects of cash-
for-care on mothers’ full time employment and earnings. Importantly, dividing the mothers in 
two groups (those with college degrees and those without), the negative effects lasted only 
until the child turned two for mothers with a college degree. Effects instead persisted up to the 
age of four or five in the cases of children of mothers with a lower level of education. 
Similarly, there were no effects after the cash-for-care period for mothers with high earnings, 
but effects did persist after the cash-for-care period for mothers whose earnings were under 
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the median. The effects on mothers’ employment and earnings disappeared when the children 
reached the age of six or seven for all groups. 
Confirming the mediating role of mothers’ education, effects also seem to be stronger 
for lower educated women in relation to being employed and number of working hours 
(Rønsen, 2009; Shøne, 2004). However, Naz (2004) found that, in the short term, the negative 
effects of cash-for-care in terms of numbers of working hours and specialisation in the 
household are stronger for higher educated women. Thus, the role mothers’ education plays is 
not entirely clear. Regarding immigrant background, Hardoy and Shøne (2010) analysed 
register data and found that, in Norway, cash-for-care reduces the levels of participation in the 
labour market of non-Western immigrant mothers’ more than for native-born mothers. Using 
cash-for-care may thus make it harder to enter or re-enter the labour market for the most 
vulnerable group of mothers. 
In light of previous findings on cash-for-care effects in Norway, it seems likely that 
cash-for-care also negatively affects female participation on the labour market in Sweden. For 
employed mothers, cash-for-care may be an incentive to withdraw from the labour market or 
to decrease the number of working hours and, for unemployed mothers, cash-for-care may be 
a disincentive to enter the labour market.  
In this study we investigated the characteristics of the female population in 
municipalities with and without cash-for-care, and were also able to take into account 
contextual characteristics that are often overlooked in previous research, such as the type of 
municipality (rural/urban/mixed) and employment and unemployment trends. As labour 
markets in rural areas offer fewer jobs and less mobility, we expect the effects to be stronger 
in these areas. Women in urban areas have more opportunities to enter the labour market after 
cash-for-care period (if they were unemployed before), and it is also likely that public 
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childcare is more widely available. Attitudes to gendered division of childcare may also exist 
between urban and rural municipalities (see e.g. Ellingsen & Lilleaas, 2010).  
 
Data and methods 
Data sources 
For the empirical analysis we used macro-data at the municipal level, collected from different 
sources. Data on which municipalities offered cash-for-care benefits during the period 1 July 
2009‒31 December 2011 were collected from reports produced by Statistics Sweden (2011, 
2012). The dates of introduction and cancellation of the policy are clearly stated in these 
reports. When in doubt, we consulted the municipality websites or contacted the staff at the 
municipalities for more details. Other data at the municipal level came from official labour 
statistics and population registers (register of the total population and the multigenerational 
register) and were collected from the website of Statistics Sweden. 
 
Sample and methods 
We divided the sample of municipalities into ‘treated’ and ‘control’ municipalities. The 
‘treated’ municipalities offered the policy continuously in 2009, 2010 and 2011, while the 
‘control’ municipalities did not offer the policy in any of the years. Out of the 290 Swedish 
municipalities, 93 belonged to the treated group and 172 to the control group. Twenty-five 
municipalities were excluded from the sample as they offered the policy at some point during 
the period 2008‒2012, although not continuously during the years 2009, 2010 and 2011.We 
first compared female employment rate trends in municipalities with and without cash-for-
care (trend analysis), to investigate any changes after the introduction of the policy in 2008 in 
any of the groups. Following, we ran Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions estimating 
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the effects of the introduction of the cash-for-care policy on female employment growth rates, 
that is, changes in female employment rates after the introduction of the policy.  
The nature of this study is that of a quasi-experiment, since it allows the ‘cash-for-care 
treatment’ effect to be identified, but it lacks the key ingredient of natural experiments, that is, 
the ‘random assignment’ (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). We are aware that data at the 
municipal level carry the risk of ecological fallacy, in the sense that many exogenous and 
endogenous factors other than cash-for-care may affect employment in the different 
municipalities. We therefore compared treated and control municipalities within selected 
subgroups of municipalities sharing similar aspects, and we controlled for important 
characteristics for female employment in the municipalities in the regressions. A research 
design based on a quasi-experiment may thus be seen as appropriate to policy studies and, in 
particular, to indicate the causal effects of policy. 
 
Variables 
All the variables were measured at the municipal level. As detailed data on mothers’ 
employment were not available, the female population aged 20‒44 was used as a proxy for 
eligible mothers for all the variables referring to female population. The dependent variable in 
the regression analysis was the female employment growth rate 2007‒2012, which measured 
the change in female employment rates between the year prior to the introduction of the 
policy and four years after the introduction of the policy female employment rate2012 − female employment rate2007female employment rate2007 ∗ 100 
We divided the municipalities into various categorisations relevant for the study of 
female employment trends. First, municipalities were divided into urban/rural/mixed to single 
out the contextual variation, basing this categorisation on the description of types of 
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municipalities by the Swedish Association of Local Authority and Regions (2011). The 
category ‘urban’ included big cities and surrounding municipalities, as well as commuter 
municipalities and municipalities located in densely populated areas. The category ‘rural’ 
included rural municipalities and municipalities located in sparsely populated areas. The 
category ‘mixed’ included touristic and industrial municipalities. We assumed that the labour 
market was diversified, more flexible and better paid in urban municipalities, and more 
traditional and less flexible in rural areas. We also assumed the labour market in mixed 
municipalities to be different from the labour markets in urban and rural areas and partly 
gender-divided, because of heterogeneous economic activities including, for example, mining. 
In the regression models, rural and mixed municipalities were aggregated into one group in 
order to create a more representative group of non-urban, treated municipalities. Further, we 
created several variables to measure some aspects of the female population affecting the 
labour market: female education, immigrant background and fertility levels. In this case, we 
used data from 2004 to 2012 to show the female employment rate trends, and average data for 
the period 2007‒2012 for the regression regressions. 
Regarding female education, we measured both the shares of high and low educated 
female population, as previous literature showed that the use of cash-for-care may have had 
different effects on women with high and low education. Since high shares of highly educated 
women and high shares of lowly educated women can co-exist in the same municipality and 
compete on different labour markets, we considered the two variables separately. The share of 
highly educated women refers to the average share of the female population aged 20‒44 in the 
municipality that had completed at least three years of post-secondary education. In the trend 
analysis, the variable was used as a dummy for each year 2004‒2012, scoring ‘high’ when 
such value was equal or above the median proportion of highly educated female population 
among all Swedish municipalities (18.5%) and ‘low’ when it was lower than this. In the 
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regression models, we considered the variable as continuous and used the average value in the 
period 2007-2012, which is the period used for the female employment growth rates. 
The share of lower educated women refers to the average share of the female 
population aged 20‒44 in the municipality with less than nine years of education at primary 
and secondary school. In the trend analysis, the variable was used as a dummy for each year 
2004‒2012, scoring ‘high’ when such value was equal or above the median proportion of 
lower educated female population among all Swedish municipalities in the same period 
(1.5%) and ‘low’ when it was lower than this. In the regression models, we considered the 
variable as continuous and used the average value in the period 2007‒2012, which is the 
period used for female employment growth rates. 
The share of foreign-born women, also referring to the female population aged 20-44 
in the municipality, was used as a dummy for each year 2004‒2012 in the trend analysis, 
scoring ‘high’ when such value was equal or above the median proportion of foreign-born 
females among all the Swedish municipalities (11.9%) and ‘low’ when it was lower than this. 
In the regression models, we considered the variable as continuous and used the average value 
in the period 2007‒2012, which is the period used for female employment growth rates. 
Fertility rates refer to the average total fertility rates among the population aged 20‒44 
in the municipality. In the trend analysis, the variable was used as a dummy for each year 
2004‒2012, scoring ‘high’ when such value was equal or above the median fertility rate 
among all the Swedish municipalities (2%) and ‘low’ when it was lower than this. In the 
regression model, we considered the variable as continuous and used the average value in the 
period 2007‒2012, which is the period used for the female employment growth rates. 
 In order to control for economic and labour market trends, we added the yearly male 
employment growth rate in the municipality and the female unemployment rate to the 
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regression models. The first was measured as the above female employment growth rate, but 
it referred to the male population aged 20‒44: male employment rate2012 − male employment rate2007male employment rate2007 ∗ 100 
The female unemployment rate was calculated as the share of the unemployed female 
population aged 20-44 during the period 2007-2012 of the total female population of the same 
age during the same period. 
 
Results 
Female employment trends 
In order to assess any potential associations between the cash-for-care policy and female 
employment, we first compared female employment rates trends for the treated and control 
groups of municipalities. Such trends ran parallel during the whole period 2004‒2012 and 
were still positive after the introduction of the policy in 2008 (Figure 1). 
Although we did not expect there to be any specific differences between the two 
groups of municipalities, female employment rates in the treated municipalities were higher 
than in the control municipalities during the whole period 2004‒2012.  
[Insert Fig.1] 
A similar pattern existed for male employment rates trends in the treated and control 
groups of municipalities (Appendix 2, Figure A1). Employment rates dropped for both sexes 
during the years 2008‒2009, most probably due to the economic crisis, and they increased 
afterwards.  
 The gap between the control and treatment groups’ employment trends was constant 
over the whole period for both females and males. There may be a number of explanations for 
this gap in employment rates between the two groups. First, the Swedish capital, Stockholm, 
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with economically favourable conditions, belonged to the treatment group. However, even 
excluding Stockholm from the sample, both male and female employment rates for the treated 
group were higher compared with the control group (not shown). Other explanations for the 
higher employment for the treated group could be sought in the composition of groups: for 
example, the treated group mostly included urban municipalities (where more jobs are 
available) and more municipalities led by Liberal-Conservative majorities (Liberal-
Conservative parties are generally favoured in richer municipalities or municipalities with 
more businesses and entrepreneurs, which are the municipalities with higher employment 
rates).  
Next, we compared female employment rates in the treated and control municipalities 
in sub-samples of municipalities based on: type of municipality (urban, rural and mixed), 
shares of highly and low educated women, shares of foreign-born women, and fertility levels. 
We found there to be no difference in trends for the treated group as compared with the 
control group in any of the sub-samples, except for the division of municipalities into urban, 
rural and mixed.  
Among the urban municipalities, female employment rates in the treated 
municipalities were higher than the female employment rates in the control municipalities for 
the whole period 2004‒2012 (Figure 2). However, the female employment rates in the rural 
and mixed municipalities followed a different pattern. Among the rural municipalities, the 
female employment rates in the treated group were higher, compared with the control group 
and the national average of rural municipalities only until 2007 (Figure 3).  
Between 2007 and 2009, these trends turned negative for both the control and treated 
groups, and by the time of economic recovery in 2010 the trends for the two groups had 
switched positions: in the treated group of municipalities, female employment rates had 
decreased and they became lower than in the control group of municipalities. In 2012, there 
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was a new downturn in female employment rates in the treated group of municipalities, not 
observable in the control group of municipalities. Among the rural municipalities, we saw a 
slower recovery in the female employment rates after 2009 and a drop in 2012 for the treated 
group of municipalities. This pattern could be linked to the use of cash-for-care. However, 
divergences in trends in the treated and control groups of municipalities were also evident in 
2005, suggesting that factors other than the policy might have differently affected the 
employment trends in the two groups.   
 Among the mixed municipalities, the female employment rates in the treated group of 
municipalities were constantly higher compared with the female employment rates in the 
control group, and the female employment rates trends were very similar for the two groups 
up to year 2010. After 2010, the female employment rates trend for the treated group became 
negative, diverging from the positive trend of the control group (Figure 4). 
[Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4] 
The male employment rates trends for each sub-sample of urban, rural and mixed 
municipalities showed no parallel differences between the treated and control groups after 
2009 (Appendix 3, Figures A2 to A4).   
 We conclude that there is a negative association between the availability of cash-for-
care and female employment rates in rural and mixed municipalities after 2009 and 2010 
respectively, and, in particular, in 2012. The sample of rural municipalities was too small to 
draw any conclusions from, as only 11% of rural municipalities were included in the treated 
group (Årjäng, Vansbro, Härnösand, & Robertsfors) but the sample of mixed municipalities 
was larger (19% of mixed municipalities were included in the treated group, i.e., 14 
municipalities). In the regression models, the rural and mixed municipalities were aggregated 
into one group in order to create a more representative group of non-urban, treated 
municipalities. 
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One of the reasons we find a negative association between the availability of cash-for-
care and female employment rates in rural and mixed municipalities, but not in urban 
municipalities, might be the larger uptake of the policy in rural and mixed municipalities, 
compared to urban municipalities (7, 8 and 4% of eligible children, respectively). The policy 
uptake in urban areas might be too small for any effects on female employment to be detected 
at aggregated level.  
 
Estimation models  
We ran several models estimating the association between the cash-for-care policy and 
changes in female employment rates after the introduction of the policy (Table 1). In all the 
models we used the dummy variable ‘cash-for-care’ as an independent variable and the 
‘female employment growth rate’ between years 2007 and 2012 as the dependent variable. 
The former indicated whether the municipality offered the policy from 2009 to 2011, that is, 
whether the municipality belonged to the treated group of municipalities or not. The latter 
measured the female employment growth rate between the year prior to the introduction of the 
policy and four years after the introduction of the policy.  
In Model 1, the independent variable cash-for-care was positively associated with 
female employment growth rates. This result adds to the scenario that we saw in the trend 
analysis: the female employment rates (Figure.1) and female employment growth rates (Table 
1, Model 1) were both higher in the treated municipalities. However, in Model 2 controlling 
for other variables, the association between cash-for-care and female employment growth 
rates disappears. Models 2‒7 show that, in general, during the period 2007‒2012 female 
employment growth rates grew more in urban areas. Male employment growth rates were 
positively associated to the female ones, since economic trends are expected to affect both 
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female and male employment growth. Moreover, female unemployment rates were positively 
associated with the dependent variable.  
 In relation to the characteristics of the female population, the female employment 
growth rates were negatively associated with the shares of low educated and foreign-born 
women and positively associated with the share of highly educated women and fertility in the 
municipality (Table 1, Models 2‒7). The rural and mixed areas variable was found to be 
negatively associated to the female employment growth rate in Models 2‒7.  
In Models 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, we estimated interaction effects of cash-for-care with rural and 
mixed areas, shares of low and highly educated women, shares of foreign-born women and 
fertility rates. The interaction coefficients of the cash-for-care share of low educated women 
and fertility rates were all non-significant, but cash-for-care in rural and mixed areas had a 
negative impact on the outcome. 
Insert Table 1 
In order to take into account the fact that the policy uptake varied in different 
municipalities, we tested variants of the above models including the average percentage of 
eligible children that used the policy during years 2009‒2011 (i.e., the period used to classify 
the municipality as ‘treated’ in each municipality). We estimated the results both adding the 
average policy uptake as a control variable and using it as independent variable, by replacing 
the general ‘cash-for-care treatment’. The results did not change substantially and we prefer 
the models shown here as ‘treatment-effects’ dummy effects are much easier to interpret and 
understand (the alternative results are available upon request).  
To test the effects of cash-for-care on female employment growth rates in rural and 
mixed areas, we ran Models 1 and 2 in the subsamples of municipalities in rural and mixed 
areas, as well as in urban areas (Table 2). The analysis showed that the association between 
cash-for-care and female employment growth rates was negative in rural and mixed areas 
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(Table 2, Model 1a) and positive in urban areas (Table 2, Model 1b). After controlling for 
other characteristics of the female population in the municipalities, the positive coefficient of 
cash-for-care in urban areas disappeared, while the negative coefficient of cash-for-care 
remained substantial and negative in rural and mixed areas (Model 2a). In rural and mixed 
areas, the treated group of municipalities showed, on average, female employment growth 
rates as 1.6 percentage points lower compared with the control group, after controlling for 
other factors (Table 2, Model 2a).  
Insert Table 2 
Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to find out whether the cash-for-care policy has had any effect on 
mothers’ employment in Sweden. We tried to answer the research question: did the cash-for-
care policy affect female employment in Sweden? We did this by investigating changes in the 
female employment rates and female employment growth rates in all Swedish municipalities. 
Since the policy was implemented at the municipal level, we used this opportunity to analyse 
cash-for-care as a quasi-experiment. We compared the trends in female employment rates in 
municipalities that offered the policy and municipalities that did not offer the policy, and we 
ran linear regressions to estimate the effects of the adoption of cash-for-care on changes in 
female employment rates after the introduction of the policy. 
Our results show that, in rural and mixed areas, female employment rates grew less or 
decreased in the municipalities that adopted the policy, compared to the municipalities that 
did not adopt the policy, and female employment growth rates were negatively associated 
with the adoption of the cash-for-care policy. This did not happen in urban areas. The 
association in rural and mixed areas also holds when the characteristics of the municipalities 
are controlled for, such as shares of low educated, highly educated, and foreign-born women, 
as well as fertility, male employment growth and female unemployment growth rates in the 
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municipality (Table 2, Model 2a). 
Explanations for the effect in rural and mixed areas, but not in urban areas, are best 
sought on the structural level. For instance, labour markets are more flexible in urban areas, 
making it easier for mothers to return to or to enter the labour market after the cash-for-care 
period ends, for example, through part-time jobs. Data showing that the share of foreign-born 
women and fertility rates are negatively associated to female employment growth rates in 
rural and mixed areas, but not in urban areas, seem to support the thesis of differences in the 
labour market structures in the two areas (Table 2, Models 2a and 2b).  
We are aware that these results must be interpreted with care. In fact, the use of 
aggregated data at the municipal level always carries the risk of ecological fallacy. In 
addition, given the small uptake of the policy, one has to be careful when identifying specific 
effects of the policy. Moreover, the policy uptake was much lower among urban 
municipalities, compared with rural and mixed areas, a factor that may have contributed to the 
fact that no effects were detected in the urban municipalities. Finally, unfortunately, the data 
did not allow for an investigation of mothers’ working hours or to distinguish between effects 
on mothers that had a permanent, a temporary or no job at the time they used the cash-for-
care, which would be an important development of this study. Despite such limits, we believe 
that the quasi-experiment research design used in this research offered a useful opportunity to 
estimate a policy impact that is important for the future family policy debate. 
Our results contribute to the debate on the cash-for-care policy, adding a distinction 
between urban and non-urban areas, which has been largely overlooked in previous 
international research. It has been pointed out elsewhere that dissimilarities in the timing and 
contextualisation of the cash-for-care policy might lead to different outcomes between the 
Nordic countries (Duvander & Ellingsater, 2016; Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2013a). 
Thus, the Swedish case with alternative childcare options, more flexibility on the labour 
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market, and a smaller uptake of the policy might have limited the negative effects of cash-for-
care on female employment to the most sensitive areas of the country compared with more 
general negative effects found in Norway. 
It is also a possibility that rural and mixed areas may have been more greatly affected 
because of structural characteristics as, for example, the labour market. Moreover, from an 
economic point of view, living costs and salaries are higher in urban areas compared with 
rural areas, as is the relative opportunity-cost of not working. Following, not working should 
be more costly for mothers living in urban areas. Negative effects on female employment 
growth rates in rural and mixed areas may also be because these are the areas where women 
are more vulnerable on the labour market and where the labour markets do not offer sufficient 
opportunities to combine family and work. Such limits in opportunities are likely to go hand 
in hand with more traditional views of who should take care of the children.  
 Even though cash-for-care has just been abolished in Sweden, these regional 
differences are important for the policy impact in other countries, as well as for any potential 
new directions of family policy in Sweden.  
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